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ARTICLES
DOES GARCIA PRECLUDE AN ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
AFFIRMATIVE LIMITATION ON THE CONGRESS'S
COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER?
Joseph John Jablonski, Jr.*
I do not think it for the interest of the General Government itself,
& still less of the Union at large, that the State governments
should be so little respected as they have been. However, I dare say
that in time all these as well as their central government, like the
planets revolving around their common sun, acting & acted upon
according to their respective weights & distances, will produce that
beautiful equilibrium on which our Constitution is founded, and
which I believe it will exhibit to the world in a degree of perfection,
unexampled but in the planetary system itself. The enlightened
statesman, therefore, will endeavor to preserve the weight and in-
fluence of every part, as too much given to any member of it would
destroy the general equilibrium.
-Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peregrine Fitzhugh (Feb. 23,
1798).1
* B.A., 1981, University of Pennsylvania; M.A., 1983, University of Pittsburgh; J.D., 1987,
University of Pennsylvania; Law Clerk to the Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 1987-88.
I express my gratitude to Professor David M. Skover of the Indiana University Law
School for his comments and suggestions, and to the Honorable Francis J. Larkin, Chairman
of the Editorial Board of The Judges' Journal for his encouragement. I am thankful to the
Honorable Stanley J. Jablonski and Mary T. Jablonski for their unwavering confidence and
support, and to my late grandfather Adolph Jablonski, whose character and courage have
been a source of continued inspiration for me.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peregrine Fitzhugh (Feb. 23, 1798), reprinted in 7
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 208, 110 (P. Ford ed. 1896).
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INTRODUCTION
The recent eleventh amendment decisions of Welch v. Texas
Department of Highways & Public Transportation2 and Atas-
cadero State Hospital v. Scanlon suggest that the eleventh
amendment4 can affirmatively limit Congress's commerce clause
power.5 However, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority6 broadly overrules the tenth amendment7 case of Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery,5 and appears to remove any theo-
retical foundation for such a limit.9 Professor Brown, a recent con-
vert to the "congressional supremacist" view, 10 established by
2. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987) (plaintiff barred from suing Texas in federal court because
Congress failed to authorize federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states in
the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (Supp. 1 1983)). The further question of whether the state of
Texas waived its eleventh amendment immunity was not before the Court. Id. at 2946.
3. 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (holding that the state of California had neither consented to
federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against it arising out of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)), nor
had the Congress unilaterally created federal jurisdiction over such suits.
4. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
5. In Welch, the Court stated that it neither decided, nor intimated a view on the ques-
tion of whether Congress may subject unconsenting states to private damage suit in federal
court, as an exercise of its commerce clause power to regulate interstate commerce. See
Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2946-47. Professor Skover suggests that Atascadero ought not be read
as foreclosing an eleventh amendment affirmative limit on Congress's commerce clause
power, or, more broadly, as foreclosing a limit on Congress's article I power. See Skover,
"Phoenix Rising" and Federalism Analysis, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 271, 301 n.106 (1986);
see also Jablonski, The Eleventh Amendment: An Affirmative Limitation on the Commerce
Clause Power of the Congress-A Doctrinal Foundation, 37 DE PAUL L. REv. 547 (1988).
6. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) requiring a metropolitan transit authority to meet minimum wage and overtime
standards, did not violate the tenth amendment). In reaching their conclusion, the Court
did away with all substantive restraints on the commerce clause power, and suggested that
the national political process constituted the "principal" limit on the federal government's
power over the states. See id at 550-56.
7. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
8. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that Congress exceeded its substantive power under the
commerce clause and thus violated the tenth amendment, by requiring the states to meet
federal minimum wage and maximum hours standards under the 1974 amendments to the
FLSA). National League of Cities was subsequently overruled. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
9. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556-57. By suggesting that the national political process is the
"principal" constitutional safeguard of state sovereignty, Garcia appears to remove the pos-
sibility of any meaningful, judicially enforceable, affirmative limits on federal power over
states. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 302-04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
10. See Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amend-
ment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.J. 363 (1985).
1988] ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Professors Nowak" and Tribe,12 argues that in the aftermath of
Garcia all the states have left is "process with a bite, 1 3 despite
any implications of Atascadero to the contrary.14
In the 1987 case of United States v. Union Gas Co. (Union Gas
II), 5 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the Seventh
Circuit's decision in In re McVey Trucking, Inc.,"6 subscribed to
the "congressional supremacist" view by characterizing the elev-
enth amendment as a mere "presumption of immunity.1 7 The
court held that Congress, in an exercise of its article I power to
regulate interstate commerce, 8 may compel an unconsenting state
government to defend a private damage suit in federal court, as
long as it speaks clearly to that effect on the face of the statute.1 9
11. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against
State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975).
12. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation and Regulation: Sep-
aration of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REv. 682 (1976).
13. Brown, supra note 10, at 365.
14. Id. What is particularly intriguing about Professor Brown's position are his state-
ments, that, on the one hand he views "Atascadero as a tacit rejection of the [congressional
supremacist] position" and that on the other, that the Court will "back down, despite Atas-
cadero, and abandon the concept of limits generated by the eleventh amendment." Id.
15. 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
16. 812 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 227 (1987).
17. Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1354; see also McVey, 812 F.2d at 318.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
19. Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1354. This case has a complex procedural history. In
United States v. Union Gas Co. (Union Gas I), 792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1986), vacated and
remanded, 107 S. Ct. 865 (1987), the Third Circuit held that the eleventh amendment
barred the defendant-third party plaintiff, Union Gas Company, from suing the state based
on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(Superfund Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). In Union Gas I, the court reasoned that
because the Superfund Act did not indicate congressional intent to remove the eleventh
amendment immunity of the states, a private plaintiff could not sue the state of Pennsylva-
nia in federal court, under the Act. See Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1345. After Union Gas I,
the Union Gas Company filed a petition for certiorari on October 8, 1986, which the Su-
preme Court granted. 107 S. Ct. 865 (1987). On October 16, 1986, the President signed the
Superfund amendments. Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1346. The Supreme Court then vacated
their decision in Union Gas I, and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 [SARA], Pub. L. No. 99-499."
Union Gas I, 107 S. Ct. at 865.
On remand, the Third Circuit determined that the Superfund amendments, particularly
§§ 101(b) and 120(a)(1) of SARA, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(20)(D) and 9620(a)(1)
(West Supp. 1987), evinced unequivocal congressional intent to authorize private damage
suits against states in federal court. Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1349. Convinced that the
Superfund amendments were passed pursuant to the commerce clause, the court then ad-
dressed the underlying fundamental constitutional issue: whether Congress may unilaterally
remove eleventh amendment immunity of state government when invoking its commerce
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Specifically, the 1987 amendments to the Superfund Act were held
to evince Congress's intent that states could be compelled by pri-
vate plaintiffs to defend damage suits in federal court under the
Act.20 In its October 1988 term, the Supreme Court may decide
whether Union Gas II properly held that Garcia necessarily re-
quires a "toothless" eleventh amendment. 21 Deciding that issue,
the Court would revisit the larger, more fundamental issue of
whether the Constitution contains any judicially enforceable af-
firmative protection of state sovereignty.22
This Article analyzes the major issues raised by Garcia concern-
ing'an eleventh amendment affirmative limitation on the Con-
gress's commerce clause power.23 It suggests that, despite Union
Gas II and the congressional supremacist view, the eleventh
amendment is the "'constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the
several States' "24 from unconsented private damage suits in fed-
eral court, an immunity which Congress is bound to respect. The
eleventh amendment is, therefore, an affirmative limit on Con-
gress's commerce clause power to create federal jurisdiction over
private damage suits against state governments.2 5 Following Pro-
clause power, and held that the Congress does possess such power. Id. at 1350-51. Pennsyl-
vania filed another petition for certiorari which was granted in March 1988. Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
20. The Court in Union Gas II held that 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) and 9620(a)(1) (1987)
indicated Congress's intent to authorize private damage suits against states in federal court
seeking compensation for liability under the Superfund Act. Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1348
(construing SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(b)(1), 100 Stat. 1613, 1615 (1986)).
21. See supra note 19. Before reaching the issue of Garcia's preclusive effect, the Court
would have to find that Congress intended to authorize private damage suits against states
in federal court under the SARA amendments to the Superfund Act.
22. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (" 'The issue ... is whether
the federal system has any legal substance, any core of constitutional right that courts will
enforce.' ") (quoting C. BLACK, PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 30 (1963)).
23. Another article has endeavored to respond to some of the historical and linguistic
issues presented by Union Gas II and the congressional supremacists for an eleventh
amendment limit on Congress's commerce clause power. See Jablonski, supra note 5, at 556-
87.
24. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)
(quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979)); see Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242 (the
eleventh amendment represents "the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in
federal court").
25. The eleventh amendment, in my view, provides constitutionally guaranteed protec-
tion to the states, from private damage suits in federal court. Congress may not unilaterally
remove this protection, regardless of how loudly and clearly it speaks on the face of a com-
merce clause statute.
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fessor Wechsler,26 Garcia suggested that the national political pro-
cess is the principal, if not the sole, safeguard of state sover-,
eignty However, Garcia also stated that "[t]hese cases do not
require us to identify or define what affirmative limits the consti-
tutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the
States under the Commerce Clause."28 Justice Scalia, in a separate
concurrence to the recent tenth amendment taxation case of South
Carolina v. Baker,29 has quoted this very language with similar em-
phasis,30 perhaps to underscore a belief that Garcia's preclusive ef-
fect on affirmative limits may not be as broad as commentary ini-
tially suggested.3 1 While Garcia left open the question of whether
those limits would be judicially enforceable, commentary suggests
that such limits "are meaningless if they cannot be enforced by the
courts."32
If eleventh amendment doctrine is justified by "the structure
and requirements of the federal system,' 33 as the Court repeatedly
emphasized in the post-Garcia case of Welch,"4 the eleventh
amendment may be one of those other "affirmative limits . . . on
federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause. '35
Welch suggests that some constitutionally significant residuum of
state sovereignty survived Garcia, and that a portion of that resid-
uum is embodied in the eleventh amendment. 6 Atascadero only
reinforces this view of Welch.
Atascadero, another major post-Garcia case, maintained that
the eleventh amendment contributes to a balance of power be-
tween the federal and the state governments37 which is a necessary
26. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
27. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552-56.
28. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
29. 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988).
30. Id. at 1369 (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. Professor Schwartz believes that Garcia may have left open the possibility of affirm-
ative state sovereignty restraints on federal power over states. Schwartz, National League of
Cities Again-R.LP. or a Ghost That Still Walks, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 141, 165 (1985). But
see Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After
Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 341, 346-49, 380-419 (after Garcia there is no basis for affirmative
state sovereignty restraints on federal power).
32. Schwartz, supra note 31, at 165.
33. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2953.
34. See id.
35. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
36. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2949-51, 2951 n.14.
37. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.2.
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foundation of individual rights and freedoms.38 Were it merely a
"presumption of immunity" as Union Gas II and McVey have
held,3 9 the eleventh amendment's salutary effect on the "constitu-
tional equilibrium between the General and the State Govern-
ments '40 could be nullified by the Congress. The residuum of state
sovereignty embodied in the eleventh amendment must thus yield
more than simply a processual limit on federal power over states.4'
This Article argues first, that the Court's "original understand-
ing" view of the eleventh amendment 2 may be harmonized with
Garcia, eleventh amendment case law, and with the logic of the
federal union.' s Part I challenges the Union Gas II assumption
that the states, by accepting the Constitution and Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce therein,"" necessarily sur-
rendered their right to be free from federal jurisdiction over com-
pulsory private damage suits against them.
Second, the Article suggests that, despite recent commentary,45
the governmental-proprietary distinction46 is not necessary to an
eleventh amendment affirmative limit on Congress's commerce
clause power. Part II argues that the determination of independent
state consent,'7 the basis of any eleventh amendment affirmative
limit on the commerce clause, does not necessarily require the gov-
ernmental-proprietary distinction.48 Because it failed to identify
the principle of state consent as a foundation of eleventh amend-
ment law, Union Gas II never discussed the governmental-proprie-
tary distinction.
Third, my thesis questions a major assumption of the "congres-
sional supremacist" view-that the Wechsler thesis requires that
38. Id.
39. See Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1354; McVey, 812 F.2d at 318.
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 198 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
41. That is, some limit beyond the procedural limit provided by what Professor Tribe
has called "the clear statement rule." Tribe, supra note 12, at 695.
42. The "original understanding" view implies that the states never surrendered their
immunity from unconsented private suit in federal court when they assented to Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce. See, e.g., Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2949 (quoting Employ-
ees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 291-92 (1973) (Marshall, J., and Stewart, J., concurring)).
43. See infra notes 57-149 and accompanying text.
44. Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1355.
45. See Brown, supra note 10, at 393-94.
46. That distinction was invalidated in Garcia. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538-47.
47. See Skover, supra note 5, at 301.
48. See infra notes 150-86 and accompanying text.
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the states' eleventh amendment protection from compulsory pri-
vate damage suits in federal court evaporates when Congress
clearly authorizes such suits. 49 In Garcia, the Court adopted the
Wechsler thesis for state interests under the tenth amendment.
Part III assumes that the Wechsler thesis is valid for state inter-
ests under the tenth amendment, 51 but suggests that the structural
relationship between the states and the federal courts provides a
constitutional basis for an eleventh amendment affirmative limit
on Congress's power to create federal jurisdiction over private suits
against state government.2
Finally, Part IV builds on Part III and argues that eleventh
amendment law results from jurisdictional problems inherent in
the federal union.5 3 Eleventh amendment principles have validity
independent of Garcia because they address the structural con-
cerns inherent in the assertion of jurisdiction in a "system of dual
sovereignties, in which the states have no representation in the
federal judiciary.5 5 Thus, there is some basis for the view that elev-
enth amendment state sovereignty is on the rise. 6
49. See Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1350-56 ("where Congress has clearly articulated its
desire to abrogate the eleventh amendment, any further expansion of the eleventh amend-
ment is unwarranted."). Id. at 1354. Professors Brown, Nowak, and Tribe adhere to the
"congressional supremacist" view. See Brown, supra note 10, at 393-94 (feels bound by the
Wechsler thesis); Nowak, supra note 11, at 1441-42 (stating that "the court should take a
limited role in reviewing congressional grants of jurisdiction allowing suits against states,"
implying that review should be limited to determining whether Congress has met a statutory
construction standard in authorizing private suits against states in federal court); Tribe,
supra note 12, at 695 (concluding that the "clear statement rule" is the sum and substance
of the states' eleventh amendment protection from congressional power to grant federal ju-
risdiction over them).
50. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552-56.
51. In making this assumption I do not imply any endorsement of the Wechsler thesis
for tenth amendment interests.
52. See infra notes 187-225 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 226-57 and accompanying text.
54. Welch, 107 S.Ct. at 2953.
55. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 n.9 (1981); see infra notes 168-204
and accompanying text.
56. See Skover, supra note 5, at 298-304.
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I. SURRENDER OF 11TH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY?
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity and Tenth Amendment
Analysis
1. Jurisdictional Versus Substantive Limits on Federal Power
While Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
may remove all, or nearly all, substantive restraints on the Con-
gress's commerce clause power over states,' 7 an eleventh amend-
ment-based affirmative limit would not be substantive, but juris-
dictional. 8 An eleventh amendment jurisdictional limitation would
be a judicially enforceable limitation on congressional power over
the states. Garcia did not necessarily foreclose the possibility of
judicially enforceable affirmative limits on federal action impacting
states."
In contrast to the tenth amendment limit based on National
League of Cities v. Usery,60 an eleventh amendment affirmative
limit would not invalidate commerce clause legislation providing
for federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against state gov-
ernments. Rather, in the absence of a state's waiver of its eleventh
amendment immunity, such a limit would circumscribe the juris-
dictional reach of such legislation to state court.61 Such a limit
would be a jurisdictional shield that states might use when called
to defend private damage suits in federal courts based on com-
57. 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985). "Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce
Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation
." Id. (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Missouri Department
of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 293-94 (1973) (Marshall, J., and Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (discussing the operation of such a jurisdictional limit on the Congress commerce
clause power).
59. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 "These cases do not require us to identify or define what
affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the
States under the Commerce Clause." Id. (emphasis added). In discussing the implications of
Wechsler's thesis Justice Blackmun stated that the "[F]ramers chose to rely on a federal
system in which the restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in the
workings of the National Government itself." Id. at 552 (emphasis added). Justice Black-
mun clearly does not mean exclusively. See Brown, supra note 10, at 390 (Justice Blackmun
"left open the question of whether such limits would be judicially enforceable.").
60. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (holding that "insofar as the challenged amendments oper-
ate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional government functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, §
8, cl. 3.") (footnote omitted)).
61. See, e.g., Employees, 411 U.S. at 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., and Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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merce clause legislation. "The issue is not the general immunity of
the States from private suit . . but merely the susceptibility of
the States to suit before federal tribunals.
6 2
In some tenth amendment-commerce clause cases prior to Gar-
cia, the Court reserved judgment on the eleventh amendment is-
sue, implying that the constitutional issues raised by the eleventh
amendment were different from those raised by the tenth amend-
ment.6 3 In tenth amendment-commerce clause cases of the Na-
tional League of Cities era, tenth and eleventh amendment issues
overlapped. If congressional regulations were struck down on tenth
amendment grounds," eleventh amendment issues were not re-
quired to be addressed because the substantive basis of the suit
was invalidated. In this sense, the tenth amendment "eclipsed" the
eleventh amendment, leading commentators to suggest that the
eleventh amendment rested on the tenth amendment. However, in
the major eleventh amendment decisions of Edelman v. Jordan6
(pre-Garcia) and Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon6 (post-
Garcia), the Court has clearly held that protection of states from
unconsented federal jurisdiction is but one important federalism
principle, whose constitutional source is the eleventh amend-
ment. 7 In those decisions, Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell
stated that eleventh amendment federalism concerns are deserving
of consideration in their own right.6 8
2. The Eleventh Amendment and Garcia
In the National League of Cities era, Professor Fletcher argued
that eleventh amendment principles could not be separated from
tenth amendment principles 69 and suggested that the eleventh
62. Id. at 293-94.
63. E.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 200 (1968).
64. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 833.
65. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
66. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
67. Id. at 242-43; 415 U.S. at 660-78.
68. Id. at 242-46; 415 U.S. at 677-78.
69. See Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1112-1114 (1983). Professor Fletcher identifies the
power to create state obligation under federal law with the power to create jurisdiction in
the federal courts to enforce those obligations, and in my opinion, confuses two constitution-
ally distinct analyses, one tenth, the other, eleventh amendment. Cf. Baker, Federalism and
the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 179-80 (1977) (suggesting that tenth and
eleventh amendments generate distinct analyses).
19881
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amendment had no life apart from the tenth. Union Gas II con-
firmed his view by maintaining that eleventh amendment princi-
ples must be merely a subset of the tenth amendment principles
established in Garcia.70 At first glance this seems plausible. How-
ever, one must accept either the argument that Congress's virtually
absolute power under the commerce clause to create substantive
rights in private plaintiffs against states includes an equivalent
power to create in private plaintiffs the right to use federal courts
to enforce those rights,"1 or one must adopt the argument of Union
Gas II, that Garcia must mean that the states necessarily surren-
dered any immunity from private damage suit in federal court by
ratifying the Constitution. 2 However, the implications of Garcia
may not be so far reaching.
General statements in Garcia outline what the states surren-
dered by assenting to federal authority over interstate commerce. 73
These statements should not be interpreted to include their "con-
stitutionally guaranteed immunity" from unconsented federal ju-
risdiction over private damage suits against them.74 While imply-
ing that the states surrendered a portion of their sovereignty by
ratifying a Constitution which permits Congress to create substan-
tive rights in private plaintiffs against them in exercising its com-
70. See United States v. Union Gas Co. (Union Gas II), 832 F.2d 1343, 1355-56 (3rd Cir.
1987).
71. Fletcher, supra note 69, at 1109, 1114-15; see also Brown, supra note 10, at 389
("[The] general power [to regulate] ought reasonably to include the lesser power of deter-
mining how and where the regulation is to be enforced.").
72. See Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1355 (holding that for states to maintain their elev-
enth amendment immunity in the face of national control is inconsistent with the constitu-
tional plan); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that the states surrendered any immunity from suit in federal court in their accept-
ance of the Constitutional plan); cf. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107
S. Ct. 2941, 2950-51 "Opponents of ratification, including Patrick Henry, George Mason,
and Richard Henry Lee, feared that the Constitution would make unconsenting States sub-
ject to suit in federal court .... [T]he representations of Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton
that the Constitution did not abrogate the States' sovereign immunity may have been essen-
tial to ratification." (footnote omitted). Id.
73. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548. "Section 8 [of Article
I] works an equally sharp contraction of state sovereignty by authorizing Congress to exer-
cise a wide range of legislative powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI) to displace contrary state legislation." Id. (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 290-92 (1981)).
74. This is apparently the interpretation made in Union Gas IL "Congress' authority
over interstate commerce stems from the plenary powers that have been granted to our
national legislature and represents a displacement of state sovereignty. Union Gas II, 832
F.2d at 1356 (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548-49 (stating both Art. I, § 8 and the fourteenth
amendment are "sharp contraction[s] of state sovereignty.")).
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
merce clause power, Garcia also states that "[t]he States unques-
tionably do retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign
authority.' ",75 "They do so, however, only to the extent that the
Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and
transferred those powers to the Federal Government. '76 Had the
states surrendered their right to be free from unconsented federal
jurisdiction over private damage suits against them by ratifying
the Constitution, or by "accept[ing] . . . the Constitutional
plan,17 7 congressional power to compel a state government to de-
fend a private suit in federal court in an exercise of the commerce
clause would "brook[] no restraint. '7 8
However, the Court's current historical view of the eleventh
amendment is that it restores the "original understanding" of arti-
cle III that states could not be compelled to defend a private suit
in federal court.79 This view implies that the states did not neces-
sarily consent to private suits in federal court by assenting to fed-
eral authority to regulate interstate commerce. Under this view,
Congress would, therefore, be bound to respect that constitutional
fact in granting jurisdiction to the federal courts over state govern-
ment. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Atascadero, main-
tained that "[t]he Constitution never would have been ratified if
the States. . .were to be stripped of their sovereign authority...
except as expressly provided by the Constitution itself."80 As Alex-
ander Hamilton suggested, part of that sovereign authority or im-
munity was the right to be free from compulsory private damage
suits in federal and foreign courts .8 Even if it could be argued that
75. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (1983) (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting)).
76. Id.
77. Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1355.
78. Tribe, supra note 12, at 689.
79. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2949 (quoting Employees 411 U.S. at 291-92 (Marshall, J., and
Stewart, J., concurring)).
80. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239 n.2 (1985).
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 549 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
It has been suggested that an assignment of the public securities of one State to the
citizens of another would enable them to prosecute that State in the federal courts
for the amount of those securities; a suggestion which the following considerations
prove to be without foundation.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense and practice of mankind; and
the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the govern-
ment of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this im-
munity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger
intimated must be merely ideal.
Id. at 548-49 (emphasis added).
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the states had surrendered that immunity by assenting to federal
authority to regulate interstate commerce, the very existence of the
eleventh amendment indicates that the states rescinded their as-
sent 2 and placed that immunity in a constitutional amendment,
beyond the reach of Congress.
B. The Eleventh Amendment Commerce Clause Cases
The eleventh amendment-commerce clause cases of Parden v.
Terminal Railway Co.,83 Employees of the Department of Public
Health & Welfare v. Missouri Department of Public Health &
Welfare, 4 and Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public
Transportation," may be harmonized with the Court's "original
understanding" theory of the eleventh amendment. By requiring
the principle of independent state consent in eleventh amendment
analysis, 6 Parden implied that the states have not surrendered
their immunity from unconsented federal jurisdiction over private
damage suits by the ratification of the Constitution, in spite of lan-
guage suggesting the contrary.8 7 This "schizophrenia ' ' ss may be
based on a confusion of common law sovereign immunity with con-
stitutional immunity under the eleventh amendment.8 9 Language
in Parden suggests that any immunity from unconsented federal
jurisdiction was surrendered by the states in their assent to federal
authority to regulate interstate commerce.90 However, Parden can-
not be properly understood without distinguishing between what
the states surrendered at the ratification of the Constitution, and
what they retained after ratification of the eleventh amendment.
If the states had surrendered all their sovereign authority relat-
ing to immunity from compulsory private damage suit in federal
court, it would have been logically unnecessary for the Court in
Parden to examine whether the actions of the state of Alabama
constituted an implied waiver of that immunity. The Court's anal-
ysis would have focused strictly on the question of whether Con-
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
83. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
84. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
85. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
86. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
87. Id. at 191-92.
88. Tribe, supra note 12, at 688-89.
89. See Jablonski, supra note 5, at 589-90.
90. Parden, 377 U.S. at 191-93.
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gress authorized federal jurisdiction over private damage suits
against the state. Yet, the Parden holding focuses, instead, on
what was done by the state, not what was done by Congress. The
Court emphasized that Alabama necessarily consented to federal
jurisdiction over private suits against the state by entering the rail-
road industry twenty years after the enactment of the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act (FELA).9 1 Parden thus may be interpreted
harmoniously with the "original understanding theory," to hold
that Congress must respect, even in an exercise of the plenary
power to regulate interstate commerce, the states' constitutionally
guaranteed immunity from unconsented federal jurisdiction over
private damage suits against them.
Employees,92 decided in 1973, confirms this view. It acknowl-
edged that, had the states actually surrendered their immunity
from unconsented federal jurisdiction over private damage suits,
by ratifying the Constitution, the Parden Court would not have
needed to examine the actions of the state in relation to the
FELA.9 Moreover, because the Congressional actions at issue in
Employees did not authorize federal jurisdiction over such suits,
the Court was not required to consider the issue of whether the
state had, through its independent action, consented to private
suit in federal court.9 4
Concurring in Employees, Justices Marshall and Stewart clearly
indicated that the states had not surrendered their immunity from
compulsory private damage suit in federal court by the ratification
of the Constitution, and explicitly used the "original understand-
ing" theory of the eleventh amendment to support this view."
They understood Parden to turn on the question of whether a
state, by its independent actions, made a knowing and voluntary
waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity." Their reasoning was
that if the eleventh amendment bars federal jurisdiction over an
91. Id. at 192.
92. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
93. Id. at 280-81 n.1.
94. See Skover, supra note 5, at 300. The suggestion in Employees that the Congress
could bring "the States to heel" or lift their eleventh amendment immunity is merely dicta,
and therefore does not undermine the above view of Parden. Employees, 411 U.S. at 283,
287.
95. Id. at 291-92 (Marshall, J., and Stewart, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 295-96. "For me at least, the concept of implied consent or waiver relied upon
in Parden approaches, on the facts of that case, the outer limit of the sort of voluntary
choice which we generally associate with the concept of constitutional waiver." Id.
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unwilling state government in a private damage suit based on the
"self-enforcing" contract clause of the Constitution, the eleventh
amendment ought not to be any less of a bar where the private
damage suit is based on congressionally created private rights."'
In Edelman v. Jordan,9 s Justice Rehnquist made explicit what
was implicit in the Employees concurrence, and suggested that the
eleventh amendment conferred "constitutional rights" on state
governments which the federal government is bound to respect. In
Edelman, a private plaintiff brought a class action against the
state of Illinois under the Aid to the Aged, Blind or Disabled
(AABD). 9 The suit was brought in federal court, seeking restitu-
tion of all AABD monetary benefits wrongfully withheld for certain
persons who had applied for those benefits over a particular period
of time. 00 The Court held that the Social Security Act and the
categorical aid program of the AABD, enacted pursuant to the ar-
ticle I power to spend for the general welfare, did not authorize
private suits against anyone, let alone a state government. 10' Al-
though Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the remedial
statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 gave the plaintiff class the right to sue the
state for past AABD benefits on an equal protection theory,102 the
Court held that the eleventh amendment nevertheless barred any
relief "which requires the payment of funds from the state
treasury.''103
Writing that the eleventh amendment barred the suit, Justice
Rehnquist explicitly articulated what underlay the Parden deci-
sion: a bilateral framework for eleventh amendment analysis re-
quiring congressional authorization of private damage suits against
state government in federal court, and some form of independent
consent by the state to that congressionally authorized
jurisdiction. 10 4
97. Id. at 292-93 n.8 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
98. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
99. AABD was a categorical aid program administered by the Illinois Department of
Public Aid pursuant to the Illinois Public Code. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 23, para. 3-1 to 3-12
(1973). The program was funded by the state and federal governments under 42 U.S.C. §§
1381-85 (1982).
100. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 656.
101. Id. at 674.
102. Id. at 678-79 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 677.
104. Id. at 672.
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In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,10 5 the Court held that Congress may
create federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states
in the absence of state consent.10 6 At issue were the 1972 amend-
ments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.107 One might
argue that, notwithstanding any contrary implications of Parden
or Employees, the states must have surrendered their immunity
from private damage suit in federal court binding on congressional
power, since independent state consent was no longer relevant.
However, the Court in Fitzpatrick based its holding on the distinc-
tion between congressional power to create federal jurisdiction
under article I, and power to create jurisdiction under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment. 108 The 1972 amendments were passed
pursuant to the fourteenth amendment enforcement power.10 9 The
Court therefore suggested that while eleventh amendment state
sovereignty had been diminished by the Civil War amendments," 0
it was not diminished with respect to article I. Fitzpatrick strongly
implied that while state consent was irrelevant to fourteenth
amendment analysis, it was still germane to an analysis of Con-
gress's article I power."'
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon"2 affirmed the Fitzpat-
rick distinction between fourteenth amendment enforcement
power and article I power, both structurally" 3 and explicitly," 4
even though the Court never reached the issue of whether Califor-
nia consented to private suits in federal court under the Rehabili-
tation Act."" In so doing, Atascadero implicitly confirms the view
that the states have never surrendered their eleventh amendment
immunity with respect to article I. As in Employees and Edelman,
the Atascadero Court held that the federal statute at issue (the
105. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
106. Id. at 456; see also Welch v. Texas Dep't. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct.
2941, 2946 (1987); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). The amendments made Title VII effective against state
governments.
108. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452-53.
109. Id. at 447.
110. Id. at 455-56; see Jablonski, supra note 5, at 598-603.
111. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452-53.
112. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
113. Atascadero can be said to structurally affirm Fitzpatrick by separating article I
spending power analysis from fourteenth amendment analysis and paralleling the distinc-
tion Fitzpatrick made between the article I power to regulate interstate commerce and the
fourteenth amendment powers. Id. at 242-47.
114. Id. at 242-43 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
115. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246-47; 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
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Rehabilitation Act) did not authorize private damage suits against
states in federal court.""i
Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transporta-
tion"' 7 explicitly reaffirmed the state consent basis of Parden by
quoting from Employees: "'Parden was premised on the conclu-
sion that [the State] . . . had consented to suit in the federal
courts.' """ On its own facts, Welch confirms this reading of
Parden as well. Because the Jones Act 19 did not evince clear con-
gressional intent to authorize private damage suits against states in
federal court,120 Welch did not require the Court to comment on
independent state consent. In this respect, Welch parallels Em-
ployees."2 Welch only invalidated any suggestion in Parden that
Congress could authorize private damage suits against states in
federal court with anything less than clear language to that effect,
appearing on the statute's face.'22
C. The Theory Created by the Cases-An Analysis
1. Entry into Interstate Commerce Is Insufficient
One might be tempted to interpret Parden v. Terminal Railway
Co.'2 ' as holding that a state surrenders its eleventh amendment
immunity simply by entering interstate commerce, since the opin-
ion contains language suggesting that when a state leaves the
sphere that is exclusively its own, it subjects itself to regulation as
fully as would a private person. 24 In Welch v. Texas Department
of Highways & Public Transportation,25 however, the Court ex-
plicitly refused to consider the validity of this proposition. 26 It is
not clear whether Parden was referring to substantive or jurisdic-
tional aspects of "regulation.' 27 The Parden Court clearly stressed
that the state's entry into the railroad industry was subsequent to
116. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247.
117. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
118. Id. at 2948. (quoting Employees, 411 U.S. at 281 n.1).
119. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
120. "We note that the question whether the State of Texas has waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity is not before us." Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2946.
121. Id. at 2947-48 (failure of the Jones Act to evince clear intent).
122. Id.
123. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
124. Id. at 196.
125. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
126. Id. at 2948.
127. See, e.g., Parden, 377 U.S. at 192 ("such regulation"); id. at 196 ("that regulation").
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the FELA's enactment.12 That implies that a state's mere entry
into interstate commerce is insufficient to constitute consent in
eleventh amendment-commerce clause analysis. Professor Field
has recognized, as the Parden Court must have, that "states could
not operate at all without being 'in interstate commerce,' as that
term is currently defined by the Court." '129
2. The Logic of the Federal Union
There are logical arguments in support of the view that any im-
munity limiting congressional power to create federal jurisdiction
over state government must have been surrendered to the federal
government by ratification of the Constitution. It is argued that
such state immunity would be incompatible with the existence of
the federal union. In United States v. Union Gas Co. (Union Gas
II),V  3 the Third Circuit phrased the issue of state immunity limit-
ing federal power in terms of the states' acceptance of the Consti-
tutional plan.' 31 Professor Tribe states that "[t]o the extent that
sovereign immunity would free a state from such national controls,
that immunity is inconsistent with the constitutional plan.'1
3 2
Professors Shapiro and Amar make charges of "lawlessness," 133 as
have Justices Brennan and Stevens. 13 Despite the alarm of these
commentators, neither would the existence of the union be jeop-
ardized, nor division among the states created, nor the enforce-
ment of federal norms against states prevented, if the eleventh
amendment were to be interpreted to limit Congress's power to
grant federal jurisdiction over state governments.
Not only do these critics appear to misunderstand the nature
and scope of eleventh amendment immunity, they also harbor an
unjustified mistrust of the state judiciary in enforcing federal
rights against states. Eleventh amendment law has never prohib-
ited the United States from suing a state directly in the federal
128. Id. at 192.
129. See Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1217 (1978).
130. 832 F.2d 1343 (3d. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
131. Id. at 1354 (relying heavily on the analysis of Professor Tribe).
132. See Tribe, supra note 12, at 694-95.
133. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1480 (1987); see Shapiro,
Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv. L. REv. 61, 71-
76 (1984).
134. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 252-58 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. 89, 126-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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courts. Thus, Congress would not be barred from compelling a
state government into federal court where the United States is a
plaintiff."5 Nor has the eleventh amendment ever prevented states
from suing other states in a federal forum."i 6 A federal forum for
such suits is "'essential to the peace of the Union.' "13 Further,
state courts are as constitutionally obligated to enforce federal
norms as are federal courts.138 Finally, the eleventh amendment
has never prevented a private plaintiff from suing a state official
personally. 3 9 An eleventh amendment affirmative limit on the
commerce clause thus would not relieve the state of its obligation
to obey and enforce federal law.
Compulsory private suits against state governments in federal
courts generally generate greater federalism tension than suits
brought by the United States, or the states, because they involve a
private plaintiff calling a sovereign state into the courts of another
sovereign. The Court has recognized that compulsory private suits
against state government do "violence to the inherent nature of
sovereignty."' 40 The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he very ob-
ject and purpose of the eleventh amendment were to prevent the
indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial
tribunals at the instance of private parties."' 4 ' After the eleventh
amendment was adopted, Chief Justice Marshall, in Cohens v. Vir-
ginia,42 demonstrated "that making a State a defendant in error
was entirely different from suing a State in an original action in
prosecution of a demand against it, and was not within the mean-
ing of the Eleventh Amendment.' 1 43 Alexander Hamilton, in essen-
tial concurrence with Chief Justice Marshall, argued in The Feder-
alist that compulsory private damage suits against states in federal
court would be contrary to the "general sense and practice of
mankind.' '1 4
4
135. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965).
136. See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1923).
137. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2953 (quoting
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328 (1934)).
138. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-94 (1947).
139. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
140. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892).
141. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887).
142. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
143. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 19 (1890) (interpreting Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at
410).
144. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 549 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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Justice Iredell, in his dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia,'41 the case
which provoked the eleventh amendment, clearly stated that he
was "strongly against any construction [of the Constitution], which
will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive private suit
against a state for the recovery of money, "146 and "every word in
the Constitution may have its full effect. ' 147 Thus, the federal in-
terest in a federal forum for private damage suits against states
should not necessarily be judged to outweigh the strong state inter-
est in being free from compelled federal jurisdiction. Given that
strong state interest in freedom from unconsented federal jurisdic-
tion, the Court should view the tension generated by private dam-
age suits against unconsenting states in federal court as tension the
federal system should not have to bear.
Indeed, Justice Marshall, in his concurrence in Employees of the
Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Missouri Department
of Public Health & Welfare,148 which is cited frequently with ap-
proval by the Court, recognized that
[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one sov-
ereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a restriction
upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has long been consid-
ered to be appropriate in a case [where the state itself has not con-
sented to congressionally authorized federal jurisdiction over private
suits] I
II. THE GOVERNMENTAL-PROPRIETARY DISTINCTION AND STATE
CONSENT
A. The Issue Raised by Garcia
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,1 50
the Court found the governmental-propriety distinction espoused
by National League of Cities v. Usery6 1 "unworkable. 152 The
Court thereby invalidated any notion of state immunity from fed-
145. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
146. Id. at 449.
147. Id. at 450.
148. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
149. Id. at 294 (Marshall, J., and Stewart, J., concurring).
150. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
151. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
152. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545.
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eral power which was based on that distinction.153 Commentary
has suggested that "mere difficulty in applying legal principles has
never been considered an adequate reason for abandoning those
principles." 154 Other commentary has suggested that the Court
could have reformulated the governmental-proprietary distinction
in terms of a "constitutive" principle of state sovereignty.-5 5 Such
reformulation, it is argued, would have met Justice Blackmun's le-
gitimate definitional and consistency concerns and, at the same
time, preserved a greater province of state sovereignty against in-
vasion by the federal government in the name of interstate com-
merce. 5" The question arises, however, whether an eleventh
amendment affirmative limit on Congress's commerce clause power
necessarily requires a governmental-proprietary distinction. If such
a limit is based on the concept of independent state consent the
question then becomes whether the determination of such state
consent would necessarily require a governmental-proprietary dis-
tinction. Professor Nowak has maintained that the determination
of whether state consent is voluntary, and thus independent from
congressional action, necessarily requires application of the govern-
mental-proprietary distinction. 57 Professor Brown accepts Profes-
sor Nowak's analysis, and maintains that because Garcia has ren-
dered the governmental-proprietary distinction invalid, any
determination of whether a state has voluntarily consented to con-
gressionally authorized federal jurisdiction is rendered impossible,
and as a result, any eleventh amendment affirmative limit on the
Congress's commerce clause power would also be impossible.'58
However, close analysis of the cases reveals that the Court has not
yet applied the governmental-proprietary distinction to reach that
conclusion and it is not clear that it would. Moreover, the views of
Professors Nowak and Brown assume an implied waiver approach,
rather than an express waiver approach, to eleventh amendment
analysis of article I power.
153. Id. at 546-47.
154. Schwartz, supra note 31, at 151.
155. Baird, State Empowerment After Garcia, 18 URB. L. 491, 509-11 (1986).
156. See id. at 511.
157. Nowak, supra note 11, at 1442-43.
158. Brown, supra note 10, at 393-94.
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B. The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction Prior to Garcia
While Parden v. Terminal Railway Co.159 established the out-
lines of a bilateral framework in which both congressional authori-
zation of private damage suits against states in federal court and
state consent to that congressional authorization must be satisfied
before federal jurisdiction constitutionally exists over a private
damage suit against a state, it also adopted an implied waiver ap-
proach to the determination of state consent.6 0 Insofar as the gov-
ernmental-proprietary distinction has actually been used in elev-
enth amendment law, however, one may argue that it has been
exclusively applied to the congressional authorization analysis and
not necessarily to the state consent analysis. Thus, the fact that
Garcia discredited the governmental-proprietary distinction does
not necessarily eliminate state consent as an independent predi-
cate to Congress's creation of federal jurisdiction over private suits
against states, under the commerce clause.
Though Parden mentions that the state of Alabama was in-
volved in what has been termed "proprietary activity,"'' the Su-
preme Court's holding that the state had constructively consented
away its eleventh amendment immunity in running a railroad
twenty years after the enactment of the FELA e2 may be justified
without reliance on the governmental-proprietary distinction. Es-
sentially, the Parden holding can be analyzed in terms of time.
The state's actions were voluntary, because it had not yet entered
the activity at the time FELA was enacted. The FELA was enacted
well before the state bought and operated a common carrier in in-
terstate commerce. Specifically, Justice Brennan stated: "[o]ur
conclusion is simply that [the state], when it began operation of an
interstate railroad approximately [twenty] years after enactment
of the FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized
by that Act.' 63 He also stated with respect to the state's consent:
"by thereafter operating a railroad in interstate commerce, [the
state] must be taken to have accepted that condition [congres-
sional authorization of private damage suits in federal court] and
thus to have consented to suit.' ' 64 Parden thus implies that had
159. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
160. Id. at 192-93 ("constructive consent").
161. Id. at 185.
162. Id. at 192.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. Id. (emphasis added).
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the state bought and operated a common carrier in interstate com-
merce prior to the enactment of the FELA, voluntary consent by
the state would not have been found.
In his concurrence to Employees of the Department of Public
Health & Welfare v. Missouri Department of Public Health &
Welfare,0 5 Justice Marshall recognized that "time,"166 and not the
governmental-proprietary distinction was the basis of the state
consent found in Parden. Parden neither used the governmental-
proprietary distinction to determine the voluntariness of state con-
sent, nor implied that this distinction would ever be used to make
that determination.
In contrast to Parden, Employees focused almost exclusively on
the issue of whether Congress intended to authorize federal juris-
diction over private damage suits against states by the FLSA.16 7
Although the Employees Court attempted to distinguish Parden
on the ground that the latter involved a proprietary activity,6 8 it
never discussed the state consent aspect of Parden in terms of the
governmental-proprietary distinction.16 9 Parden implied, on the
other hand, that in a proprietary context, Congress could effec-
tively authorize federal jurisdiction over private suits against state
governments with a less clear statute. 17 0
Conversely, Employees suggested that where a "governmental
activity" is involved, Congress must speak more clearly in the stat-
ute, in order to effectively authorize private suits against states in
federal court.'7 1 In Employees, the operation of hospitals and
schools was "governmental" activity. 7 2 The Court in Employees
neither indicated different treatment for a proprietary activity on
the state consent issue, nor suggested that Congress could not con-
stitutionally authorize federal jurisdiction regarding governmental
activity. It bears mention that the Employees Court did not use
the governmental-proprietary distinction to carve out an area of
immunity in which Congress could not regulate as it did in tenth
165. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
166. Id. at 296; see Field, supra note 129, at 1225.
167. Employees, 411 U.S. at 282-87.
168. Id. at 282; see id. at 297 n.11 (Justice Marshall rejects the Employees Court's at-
tempts to distinguish Parden on the basis of governmental-proprietary distinction).
169. Id. at 282. "The Parden case in final analysis turned on the question of
waiver. . . ." Id.
170. Parden, 377 U.S. at 190-92 (1964).
171. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 285-87.
172. Id. at 284
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amendment analysis. In fact, Justice Marshall suggested in his
concurrence, that had the Court reached the issue of state consent,
the issue could have been analyzed without resort to the govern-
mental-proprietary distinction. The focus would have appropri-
ately been on when the Congress regulated the schools and hospi-
tals by providing for private damage suits against states in federal
court. '7 3 He suggested that since the 1966 amendments were en-
acted after the state became engaged in running hospitals and
schools, state consent could not be considered voluntary in such
circumstances. 174
Professors Brown and Nowak have argued, however, that under
an implied waiver approach, voluntary state consent could not be
found in circumstances analogous to Parden, where Congress's at-
tempt was to regulate a governmental, instead of a proprietary ac-
tivity.175 The theory that a state has no choice as to whether to
begin, continue, or cease a governmental activity is the foundation
of their argument. 7 6 That theory rests on the premise that the
states are, by definition, obligated to provide "governmental" ser-
vices, and therefore never voluntarily begin or cease those services.
C. Resolution of the Issue Raised by Garcia
As Justice Marshall suggested, so long as the state has notice of
the possibility of being sued by private plaintiffs in federal court
before it engages in the activity which subjects it to that possibil-
ity, voluntary state consent can be argued to exist, irrespective of
the governmental or proprietary character of the activity. 77 In-
deed, nothing in Parden or Employees necessarily suggests that
the "governmental" character of the activity would so seriously in-
hibit a state from restructuring its services (so as to avoid suit in
federal court) that it would not be viewed as voluntary restructur-
ing. On the other hand, if the regulated activity is "governmental,"
it is more likely than not that the state, would already be engaged
in that activity when federal regulation occurred. So, in practice,
implied consent is not likely to be found in the context of a gov-
ernmental activity. Federal jurisdiction over private damage suits
173. Id. at 296 (Marshall, J., and Stewart, J., concurring).
174. Id.
175. Nowak, supra note 11, at 1448-50.
176. See Id. at 1443.
177. Employees of the Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Missouri Department of Public
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 297 n.11 (1973) (Marshall, J., and Stewart, J., concurring).
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against states can only be based on some form of express state con-
sent. 17 Under an implied waiver approach, state consent may be,
in most cases, determined by focusing on when Congress at-
tempted to regulate the state government by providing for federal
jurisdiction over private suits against it, without regard for the na-
ture of the state activity. Reserving judgment on the question of
congressional power to compel states to defend private suits in fed-
eral court, the Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public
Transportation179 Court never mentioned the governmental-pro-
prietary distinction.
In light of the recently affirmed disfavor of "constructive con-
sent" in Welch,8 0 the Court would be justified in rejecting an im-
plied waiver approach in favor of express state consent. If an ex-
press state consent approach is adopted, the governmental-
proprietary distinction becomes irrelevant. State consent would
not be measured according to whether the state undertook or re-
frained from certain federally regulated activity and thereby im-
pliedly consented, but by a state's express consent.
Parden may be viewed as an unjustified reliance on Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission,18l and as an unjustified
departure from previous eleventh amendment law that required
express state consent. 8 2 That Parden made state consent a federal
question does not render state consent meaningless or impossible
in the commerce clause context. Express state consent could be
made a matter of federal constitutional law and be consistent with
recent precedent which characterizes the eleventh amendment as
the "'constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several
States.' ,,183
178. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241.
179. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
180. See Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2945 (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673); Atascadero v.
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985) (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673).
181. 359 U.S. 275 (1959) (held that a state constructively waived its eleventh amend-
ment immunity for actions connected to an agency created by an interstate compact). The
Court based its holding on a rather vague "sue and be sued". clause in the compact entered
into by Tennessee and Missouri. Because there was no federal statute at issue, the questions
of Congress's constitutional power to abrogate the eleventh amendment, and whether the
Congress authorized private suits against states in federal court were not part of the analy-
sis. This is the major difference between Petty and Parden.
182. See, e.g., Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944); Smith v.
Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441 (1900).
183. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (quoting
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979)).
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Finally, the complex theoretical problems revolving around the
issue of whether Congress can "induce" a state to waive its elev-
enth amendment immunity could be avoided by the adoption of an
express state consent approach. Professor Tribe has expressed
some justifiable concern over whether the application of implied
consent doctrine to eleventh amendment problems would permit
Congress to condition a state's entry into a regulated area or the
receipt of federal benefits on a state's waiver of its constitutionally
guaranteed immunity."' Could a state be said to have voluntarily
consented away its eleventh amendment immunity if Congress es-
sentially indicates that unless a state agrees to be sued by private
plaintiffs in federal court, it will not receive any federal money or
benefits from a federal program?
Professor Tribe solves the problem of "unconstitutional condi-
tions" by denying that a state has any constitutional rights under
the eleventh amendment. 85 However, such a solution flies in the
face of Edelman's suggestion that states do have rights under the
eleventh amendment."8 ' An express state consent approach would
not only be an alternative to the practically difficult implied con-
sent approach, but it would offer a solution to the unconstitutional
conditions problem, and would be more consistent with current
eleventh amendment law.
III. THE WECHSLER THESIS AND AN ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
AFFIRMATIVE LIMIT BASED ON STATE CONSENT
Theoretically one might argue, as Union Gas 11187 clearly sug-
gests, that since Garcia'88 adopted the federalism theory of the
Wechsler thesis for tenth amendment analysis, the Court would be
logically required to adopt it for eleventh amendment analysis as
well. 89 The Wechsler thesis maintains that state sovereignty inter-
184. Tribe, supra note 12, at 692-93.
185. Id. at 693.
186. 415 U.S. at 673 ("surrender of constitutional rights").
187. United States v. Union Gas Co. (Union Gas II), 832 F.2d 1343, 1354-56 (3rd Cir.
1987), cert. granted subnom. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
188. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985).
189. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 302-04 (1985) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting); see also Brown, supra note 10, at 393-94 (Professor Brown suggests
that an eleventh amendment affirmative limit on the commerce clause power would contra-
dict Garcia's federalism theory that the national political process is the sole safeguard of
state interests); Skover, supra note 5, at 299 (Professor Skover has suggested that an elev-
enth amendment affirmative limit on Congress's commerce clause power would seem to "un-
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ests are adequately protected by the legislators in Congress and
that there is no need for judicially enforcing affirmative protection
for states.190 The Wechsler thesis, as the Garcia Court understood
it,' assumes that because the states are represented in the Con-
gress, the votes of the state's representatives are votes of the states
themselves. Union Gas II, Professors Nowak and Tribe, and now
Professor Brown,192 have relied heavily on the Wechsler thesis to
support their conclusion that Congress may abrogate a state's elev-
enth amendment immunity in the exercise of its article I power to
regulate interstate commerce.
Professor Nowak believes that the eleventh amendment should
not affirmatively limit Congress's power to grant jurisdiction to the
federal courts over state government. He has stated that "the prag-
matic problems of federalism posed by the eleventh amendment
should be resolved by Congress, not by the judiciary. Congress is
the only governmental entity which shares a dual responsibility to
the state and federal systems and is accountable at both levels."' 93
Professor Tribe was quoted in Union Gas II as saying'94 that "it
has generally been recognized that the states are represented in
Congress and that Congress will be attentive to concerns of state
governments as separate sovereigns."'195 Professor Brown appears
to accept the Tribe/Nowak view and predicts that the Court will
"abandon the concept of limits generated by the eleventh
amendment.' '1 96
dermine the presumption in Garcia that national political processes safeguard federalism
concerns.").
190. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558-59
(1954); see also La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmen-
tal Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 779 (1982); J.
CHOPER, JUDIcIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980).
191. 469 U.S. at 552-54.
192. Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1354-56; Nowak, supra note 11, at 1441 nn.151-52. Inter-
estingly, despite the historical support Professor Nowak musters in support of his thesis, in
the final analysis he relies on "pragmatic" concerns to resolve the congressional power issue.
See Brown, supra note 10, at 393-94; Nowak, supra note 11, at 1441; Tribe, supra note 12,
at 695.
193. Nowak, supra note 11, at 1441.
194. 832 F.2d at 1355 (quoting Tribe, supra note 12, at 695).
195. Tribe, supra note 12, at 695.
196. Brown, supra note 10, at 365.
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The Wechsler thesis is, however, under increasing attack by
scholars 9 7 and certain members of the Supreme Court.19 Profes-
sor Shwartz recently said: "'Trust the Congress!' is hardly enough
to protect the states from federal legislators who look on them with
a more hostile eye than the Garcia opinion anticipated." '99 Profes-
sor Kaden suggests that fundamental changes in the conduct of
politics and the increasing emphasis on national programs de-
creases the sensitivity of Congress to state interests. He further as-
serts that, as a result, Congress "may no longer be as well suited
[as it once may have been] to the task of safeguarding the role of
the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental
values of federalism. '20
0
Justice Powell, the principal architect of modern eleventh
amendment jurisprudence, has vehemently attacked the relevance
of the Wechsler thesis to contemporary political realities. In his
dissent in Garcia, he argued that "[n]ot only is the premise of [the
Wechsler thesis] clearly at odds with the proliferation of national
legislation over the past [thirty] years, but 'a variety of structural
and political changes occurring in this century have combined to
make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local val-
ues.' "201 In Justice Powell's view,
[t]he adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct
election of Senators), the weakening of political parties on the local
level, and the rise of national media, among other things, have made
Congress increasingly less representative of state and local interests,
and more likely to be responsive to the demands of various national
constituencies. 202
197. See, e.g., Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 847, 849 (1979); Comment, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority and the Manifest Destiny of Congressional Power, 8 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 745
(1985); Comment, State Autonomy After Garcia: Will the Political Process Protect States'
Interests?, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1527 (1986).
198. See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557 (Powell, J., with whom Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J.,
and O'Connor, J., join, dissenting); id. at 579 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 580
(O'Connor, J., with whom Burger, C.J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J., join, dissenting). The
Garcia dissenters sharply rebuked the majority's heavy reliance on the Wechsler thesis and
indicated that such reliance was nothing less than an abdication of the Supreme Court's
constitutional responsibility.
199. Schwartz, supra note 31, at 164.
200. Kaden, supra note 197, at 849.
201. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 565 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting) (relying on ADVISORY ComMISSION
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGULATORY FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IIPACT AND
REFORM 50 (1984) [hereinafter ACIR]).
202. Id. (citing ACIR at 50-51).
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Justice O'Connor was in essential agreement with Justice Powell
and Justice Rehnquist in her dissent in Garcia and stated firmly:
"[t]he political process has not protected against [federal] en-
croachment on state activities."2 03
If the Court were going to adopt the Wechsler thesis for eleventh
amendment law, one could reasonably have expected a hint in
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, °4 (decided shortly after
Garcia) or in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public
Transportation,20 5  (an eleventh amendment-commerce clause
case). Atascadero did not even mention the Wechsler thesis, but
recognized that Garcia continued to acknowledge "that 'the States
occupy a special and specific position in our constitutional
system.' "208
Moreover, eleventh amendment immunity indeed belongs to the
states themselves. It cannot be said that the states relinquished
even a portion of that immunity at any point in our constitutional
history, except perhaps in the limited area of fourteenth amend-
ment enforcement power.20 The Court has suggested that consti-
tutional rights under the eleventh amendment belong to state gov-
ernments themselves, 08 at least in the article I power context, and
may not be waived simply by a majority vote of their representa-
tives in Congress.
Furthermore, the eleventh amendment itself suggests that the
Framers desired to codify and protect that immunity with a consti-
tutional provision, placing it beyond the reach of the state's repre-
sentatives in Congress. 0 9 The line of law developed in Parden10
and in Edelman,2 1' and implicitly supported in Atascadero2 2 and
Welch,213 suggests that the eleventh amendment requires more
than the Wechsler thesis would allow in the way of independent
state consent. One must question, therefore, whether "prag-
203. Id. at 587-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
205. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
206. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242 (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547).
207. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976); see Jablonski, supra note 5, at
600-03.
208. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
209. U.S. CONST amend. XI.
210. Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
211. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 672.
212. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246-47.
213. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2951 (1987).
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matic"'214 considerations justify conclusions contrary to constitu-
tional mandate. To this extent, eleventh amendment law may con-
tradict Professor Wechsler's thesis that the Constitution envisions
no more protection for states than that deriving from their repre-
sentation in the federal legislature.
The broadest theoretical question of eleventh amendment law
raised by Garcia is: if state tenth amendment interests are suffi-
ciently protected by the national political process, why do state
eleventh amendment interests require a principle independent
from the national political process? Stated another way, why, after
Garcia, should a majority vote of the representatives of the states
in Congress not be, in the eleventh amendment context, constitu-
tionally tantamount to the consent of those states? One commen-
tator has argued that "[a] Wechslerian critique of state sovereignty
as articulated in National League of Cities would seem equally ap-
plicable to eleventh amendment doctrine. 2 15 However, in a foot-
note to Welch, Justice Powell provocatively suggested that "the
principle that [s]tates cannot be sued without their consent is
broadly consistent with the Tenth Amendment."21 Even in the era
before Garcia, when states had substantive protection under Na-
tional League of Cities, commentary attacked the sufficiency of
the Wechsler thesis to protect state eleventh amendment interests,
and stated that "[f]inal power to balance state and federal inter-
ests ought not to reside in Congress. "217
Under the tenth amendment, state interests in sovereignty re-
volve around freedom from unduly burdensome federal regulation.
According to the Wechsler thesis, because the states are directly
represented in Congress, there is no need for judicially enforceable
limitations of federal power over states other than perhaps certain
procedural requirements.21 s Since state interests in federal regula-
tion are adequately represented in Congress, unduly onerous sub-
stantive obligations will not, in theory, be enacted. However, when
Congress authorizes federal jurisdiction over private damage suits
against state governments it necessarily involves the federal courts,
214. Nowak, supra note 11, at 1441.
215. Brown, supra note 10, at 375.
216. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2951 n.14 (emphasis added).
217. Baker, supra note 69, at 184.
218. That is that Congress speak clearly in the face of the statute, ensuring that these
state sovereign interests are recognized and considered in enacting burdensome legislation.
See Comment, The Tenth Amendment After Garcia: Process-Based Procedural Protec-
tions, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1657 (1987).
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a branch of the federal government in which state governments
have no representation and that is independent from the branch
which includes the representatives of the states. The Supreme
Court has recognized that "the [s]tates are represented in Congress
but not in the federal courts." '219
It is never Congress which ultimately exercises federal jurisdic-
tion over a state government in the context of disputes based on
federal law. It only authorizes that jurisdiction. It is a federal court
which ultimately resolves the dispute.
Neither the state governments, nor their representatives in Con-
gress, choose the federal judiciary. Indeed, state governments exert
no influence over the federal judiciary and have no control over a
federal court exercising jurisdiction over them in a private suit. A
commentator acknowledged this fact in support of a contrary the-
sis by stating that "[t]he federal judiciary .. .is insulated from
the influence of the states."220 It is precisely this structure which
necessitates the principle of state consent in order to provide a
measure of protection for a state government from an exercise of
jurisdiction by a branch of the federal government over which it
exerts no influence, and in which it has neither direct nor indirect
representation.
Federal jurisdiction, in the case of private damage suits, bears
the distinct potential for intrusive federal court supervision of
state fiscal and policy matters. That potential is only strengthened
by the loss of perhaps all substantive protection under the tenth
amendment. While some commentary has suggested that the elev-
enth amendment ought not to limit specific congressional grants of
jurisdiction,221 it should be recognized that important federalism
concerns exist whether a federal court assumes jurisdiction pursu-
ant to congressional grant, or pursuant to federal question
jurisdiction.
Justice Powell may have implicitly sanctioned this reasoning in
Welch when he stated that "[tjhe contours of [eleventh amend-
ment] immunity are determined by the structure and requirements
of the federal system. '222 Additionally, Justice Powell stated that
219. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 n.9 (1981).
220. Nowak, supra note 11, at 1441.
221. Field, supra note 129, at 1278; Nowak, supra note 11, at 1441; Tribe, supra note 12,
at 693.
222. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2953.
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"[a]lthough the dissent [in Welch] denies that [eleventh amend-
ment] immunity is 'required by the structure of the federal system'
... the principle has been deeply embedded in our federal system
from its inception. 2 23 In Garcia, Justice Blackmun suggested that
the structure of the Constitution may require certain affirmative
limits on federal power over states.224 The requirement of indepen-
dent state consent in eleventh amendment law may be one of
them.
Under the eleventh amendment, then, state interests are broader
than they are under the tenth amendment. Tenth amendment in-
terests implicate only the federal legislature; eleventh amendment
interests, however, implicate both the federal legislature and the
federal judiciary.2 25 Eleventh amendment-based rights accruing to
state government must reflect the breadth of these constitutional
interests.
IV. THE RISE OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT STATE SOVEREIGNTY?
To the extent that the eleventh amendment operates as an effec-
tive instrument of intergovernmental federalism, it must be some-
thing more than Professor Field's characterization as "common law
sovereign immunity." Moreover, if the amendment were merely a
"presumption of immunity," a view held by Union Gas 11,226 and
long held by Professors Nowak and Tribe,227 it could not function
as an effective instrument of intergovernmental federalism, since
that view would allow Congress to nullify its efficacy by simply
speaking clearly on a statute's face. Even after Garcia,228 the Court
has made it clear that the eleventh amendment's importance rests
in the "structure of the federal system, '229 and the eleventh
amendment "limitation upon the judicial power is, without ques-
tion, a reflection of concern for the sovereignty of the States. 2 30
223. Id.
224. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
225. In Union Gas II, the court altogether misses this important structural point. 832
F.2d at 1356. The court suggests that the "constitutional scheme" is a sufficient "structural"
principle to protect state interests under the eleventh amendment.
226. See United States v. Union Gas Co. (Union Gas I1), 832 F.2d 1343, 1354 (3rd Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
227. See Nowak, supra note 11, at 1441; Tribe, supra note 12, at 695-96.
228. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
229. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2953 (1987)
(citing id. at 2970 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
230. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 293 (1973) (Marshall, J., and Stewart, J., concurring in result).
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A. The Failure of the Wechsler Thesis to Protect Eleventh
Amendment State Sovereignty?
Despite commentary trivializing the eleventh amendment as
"formalities of federalism, ' 23 1  and deprecating the eleventh
amendment to the level of common law sovereign immunity doc-
trine,232 or merely a presumption of immunity,2 3 the Atascadero
Court, without reference to either Garcia or the Wechsler thesis,
boldly summarized its justification of an eleventh amendment-
based state sovereignty:
We believe ... that our Eleventh Amendment doctrine is necessary
to support the view of the federal system held by the Framers of the
Constitution. The Framers believed that the States played a vital
role in our system and that strong state governments were essential
to serve as a "counterpoise" to the power of the Federal Govern-
ment .... [N]one of the Framers questioned that the Constitution
created a federal system with some authority expressly granted the
Federal Government and the remainder retained by the several
States.234
The Atascadero Court further maintained that "[t]he Eleventh
Amendment serves to maintain [a] balance '23 5 of power between
the federal and state governments "[b]y guaranteeing the sover-
231. Baker, supra note 69, at 181.
232. Welch Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2958 (1987),
(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.); H. FINK &
M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 152 (1984); see Field, supra note
129, at 538-46; see Tribe, supra note 12, at 694-95; see also Thornton, The Eleventh
Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55 IND. L.J. 293, 305-10 (1980). To the extent that
Professor Tribe suggests that the eleventh amendment would free states from national con-
trol, he implies that the eleventh amendment operates as traditional common law sovereign
immunity in shielding the sovereign from private suit altogether. However, the eleventh
amendment is specifically directed at the issue of shielding the states from federal jurisdic-
tion not from private suits based on federal law. "A state asserting an eleventh amendment
defense is, in essence, challenging the right of the federal government to impose a monetary
burden on it." See Nowak, supra note 11, at 1441. Professor Nowak and Professor Tribe
confuse the concepts of common law sovereign immunity and eleventh amendment immu-
nity. The eleventh amendment regulates jurisdiction in a system of dual sovereignties, not
imposition of monetary burdens.
233. United States v. Union Gas Co. (Union Gas II), 832 F.2d 1343, 1354 (3d Cir. 1987),
cert. granted 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988); In re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 318 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 227 (1987).
234. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-39 n.2 (1985) (citations
omitted).
235. Id. at 242.
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eign immunity of the States against [unconsented] suit in federal
court.
236
1. State Interest in Freedom from Retroactive Relief: Federal In-
trusion into State Fiscal Matters
One fundamental liberty, cherished by both Federalists and
Anti-Federalists, is participation in effective local government."' 7
Indeed, the Court has expressed deep concern over the possible de-
pletion of a state treasury effected through federal court order."'
In Edelman, the Court indicated that the eleventh amendment
protected "state funds, 23 9 though differently. Justice Rehnquist,
for the majority of the Court in Edelman, stated that "a suit by
private parties [in federal court] seeking to impose a liability
which must be paid from the public funds [of a] state treasury' 240
or a suit seeking retroactive relief is a major focus of eleventh
amendment state sovereignty. By limiting the federal judiciary's
power to issue various forms of fiscally burdensome and institu-
tionally intrusive relief on behalf of private plaintiffs against state
government,24' the eleventh amendment contributes to the balance
of power between the federal and state governments.
236. Id.
237. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 575-76 (Powell, J., dissenting).
238. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665-69 (1974).
239. Id. at 668.
240. Id. at 663.
241. While federal court retroactive relief is clearly within the scope of the eleventh
amendment, questions remain as to what prospective relief is covered by the amendment.
Prospective relief may generally be defined as an injunction "to conform. . . future conduct
of" state officials to legal standards. Id. at 664.
While Edelman acknowledged that a state government's compliance with prospective re-
lief may place a greater burden on the state in some cases than the payment of damages
from the state treasury, id. at 667, the Court felt bound by Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), to permit federal courts to issue a broad range of prospective relief based on federal
law. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664-65. Young permitted a federal court to enjoin state officials
acting in their official capacity from enforcing a state statute violative of the fourteenth
amendment, on the theory that state officials who enforce unconstitutional statutes are
stripped of their representative authority. Young, 209 U.S. at 160. Under Young, any federal
court injunctive relief directed against state officials who are allegedly enforcing unconstitu-
tional statutes, no matter how financially onerous or intrusive such relief may be, was in
theory permissible.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89 (1984), how-
ever, indicates the Court's willingness to use the eleventh amendment to limit the federal
courts' ability to issue prospective relief against state governments. Pennhurst II held that
the eleventh amendment barred a federal court from issuing purely prospective relief, where
that prospective relief is based on state law and issued against state officials. Id. at 106.
Justice Powell distinguished Edelman on the basis that it involved federally based prospec-
tive relief, not state law based prospective relief. Id. at 105-06. He explained that the
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Without the fiscal ability to meet the needs of its citizenry, the
states' role in the federal union could be eliminated along with any
chance for a balance of power between the federal and state gov-
ernments. Even Alexander Hamilton, a forceful advocate for a
strong central government, argued that the Constitution contained
no "article or clause" permitting the federal government to dimin-
ish the fiscal reservoirs of the states.2 42 Without some assurance of
financial independence for state government, the specter of a tyr-
annizing, absolutely powerful, central government grows more
threatening. To avoid that spector, the eleventh amendment
guards against diminution of a state treasury through federal court
order.2" ' The tenth amendment limit of National League of Cities
v. Usery2"4 protected the state treasury by invalidating burden-
some federal legislation. In contrast, an eleventh amendment af-
firmative limit would guard state treasuries by limiting federal
court jurisdiction over the states and consequent federal court or-
ders against them.
2. The Inevitable Tension Created by Federal Jurisdiction over
State Governments
Welch v. Texas Department of Highway's & Public Transporta-
tion 215 recently indicated that the eleventh amendment concerns
"the delicate problems of enforcing judgments against the States,
that [were] raised by both Federalists and anti-Federalists. 2 4
These federalism concerns apply pari passu to federal question
cases, despite the view of Justice Brennan. 47 Federalism tension
supremacy clause concerns of Edelman are relevant only for the enforcement of federal law.
Id. However, Justice Powell referred to Young as a "very narrow" exception to general elev-
enth amendment principles. Id. at 114 n.25. Moreover, by citing Louisiana v. Jumel, 107
U.S. 711 (1883), with approval, Justice Powell implied that not all forms of federal law
based prospective relief would be permissible under the eleventh amendment. Pennhurst II,
465 U.S. at 101. Indeed, whether a federal court could, under the eleventh amendment, issue
federal law prospective relief where "the prospective financial burden was substantial and
ongoing," id. at 104, was intriguingly left open. Id. at 104 n.13. The Court was convinced,
however, that burdensome federal law based prospective relief "would be constrained by
principles of comity and federalism." Id.
242. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 199 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
243. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665-69 (1974).
244. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
245. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).




develops even for federal questions because in issuing relief an
unelected federal judiciary necessarily dictates to an unconsenting
state legislature or state executive what it must pay, and how it
must pay it.
The Edelman Court recognized that federal court intrusion into
state fiscal policy and state government more generally, is a matter
of no small concern for federalism. The Court in Edelman quoted
from Judge McGowan's opinion in Rothstein v. Wyman: "'[i]t is
quite another thing to order the Commissioner to use state funds
to make reparation for the past. [This] would appear to us to fall
afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional pro-
vision is to be conceived of as having any present force.'"248 Even
Professor Nowak, an opponent of the view of the eleventh amend-
ment articulated by this article, has stated that "judicial interfer-
ence with state finances poses no small danger to the workings of a
harmonious federalism.
249
Because the tensions in federal jurisdiction over state govern-
ment are structurally based, and exist whether the Congress specif-
ically grants federal jurisdiction over state government, or a federal
court assumes that jurisdiction, the eleventh amendment should be
an affirmative limit on Congress's power to create federal jurisdic-
tion. Permitting the Congress unlimited power to create federal ju-
risdiction over state government would result in frequent tension
with and destructive intrusions into state fiscal policy by federal
courts.
B. A Solution: State Courts as the Preferred Fora
In the absence of state consent to federal jurisdiction over private
damage suits, state courts should become the primary fora for
those suits against states based on article I power statutes, even
where Congress has clearly granted it. 250 The Court has approved
of federally-based private suits against states being brought in
state court. Justice Marshall stated that "[w]hile constitutional
248. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-65 (1974) (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467
F.2d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973)).
249. Nowak, supra note 11, at 1469. Professor Nowak continued and noted that the
Court will be faced with a more difficult and important question then judicial interference
with state finances. This will happen when the Court "determines the scope of congressional
power to create federal damage actions against state governments." Id.
250. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 294 (1973) (Marshall, J., and Stewart, J., concurring).
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limitations upon the federal judicial power bar a federal court ac-
tion by these [private plaintiffs] to enforce their rights, the courts
of the State nevertheless have an independent constitutional obli-
gation to entertain [private] actions to enforce those rights." '251
Justice Powell recently stated that "[i]t denigrates the judges who
serve on the state courts to suggest that they will not enforce the
supreme law of the land. 2 52 State courts are the basic adjudicators
in our federal system.25 ' They are generally not insensitive, unso-
phisticated judicial institutions,254 and they may not constitution-
ally refuse to hear federal claims against states. In addition, State
court interpretations of federal law are always subject to Supreme
Court review. 55
Relying on Professor Bator, Professor Brown has suggested that
it may be politically healthy for state courts to interpret, in the
first instance, commerce clause restrictions on state power under
which private plaintiffs sue states.2 56 State courts would be more
inclined to respect the sovereign interest of the state against dam-
age claims of private plaintiffs. Professor Nowak has suggested
that states would erect procedural impediments to private plain-
tiffs and foreclose their opportunity to sue state governments in
state court.2 57 However, the doctrine of due process, available in
both federal and state constitutions, would serve private plaintiffs
if states impeded access to state courts.
V. CONCLUSION
An affirmative limit on Congress's commerce clause power to
create federal jurisdiction over state governments is supported by
eleventh amendment doctrine, and is not necessarily precluded by
251. Id. at 298. "[The state] has courts of general jurisdiction competent to hear [private
suits against states], and the judges of those courts are co-equal partners with the members
of the federal judiciary in the enforcement of federal law and the Federal Constitution." Id.
252. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlan, 473 U.S. 234, 240 n.2 (1985) (citations omitted).
253. See generally Douglas, The Clash Over Constitutions: The Reassertion of State
Authority, 26 JUDGES' J. 38 (Summer 1987).
254. Id.; Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An
empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 213, 225-31 (1983); Wolcher,
Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own
Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 189, 235-44 (1981).
255. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821).
256. Brown, supra note 10, at 391 (citing Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. Rav. 1030, 1037 (1982)).
257. Nowak, supra note 11, at 1447.
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Garcia.258 Neither Garcia's invalidation of the governmental-pro-
prietary distinction, nor its adoption of the Wechsler thesis
presents insuperable problems for such a limit. Despite the tenth
amendment's demise, the eleventh amendment still has a role to
play in the relationship of the federal government to state govern-
ments, and in mitigating the various sources of tension inherent in
that relationship. An affirmative limit on Congress's commerce
clause power would mediate Garcia's effect on the federal union. It
would require private plaintiffs to sue states, under commerce
clause statutes, in state courts. State courts would inherently be
more sensitive to the interests of a sovereign state. An eleventh
amendment state sovereignty would also bolster respect for the
state judiciary, the basic adjudicator for our system of government.
James Madison, the principal architect of the Constitution,
maintained that effective state governments would become bul-
warks against a central government bent on encroaching on the lib-
erties of the people.25 Alexander Hamilton understood that just as
there exists a tendency in the state governments to invade the
sphere of the federal government, there exists in the central gov-
ernment a tendency to interfere with and intrude into, if not alto-
gether annihilate, the spheres of state and local governments.26 0
Since Garcia, Congress may interfere virtually carte blanche with
what have hitherto been known as integral state functions.
The need for eleventh amendment protection for the states has,
therefore, never been greater. Even before Garcia, commentary ar-
gued for more eleventh amendment protection for the states.261
Were the Court to affirm Union Gas II2" and hold that the Con-
gress may remove a state's eleventh amendment immunity in an
exercise of commerce clause power, there would, in theory, be no
limit to intrusive federal court supervision of state policy. Limiting
federal intrusions on state sovereignty is necessary to the success
of the American experiment in government and the ultimate objec-
tive of that experiment, individual liberty. There is considerable
reason supporting a reversal of Union Gas II. Far from "be-
258. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
259. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 322 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
260. THE FEDERALST No. 31, at 198 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
261. Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REV.
207, 245 (1968).
262. United States v. Union Gas Co. (Union Gas I1), 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
1988]
38 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1
tray[ing] the intellectual history of the American Revolution," '263
an eleventh amendment state sovereignty would work to secure its
basic promise.
263. Amar, supra note 133, at 1466.
